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 Although the exact meaning of Friedrich Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal 
recurrence is widely contested, at its most basic level the doctrine asks us to 
consider how we feel about our lives. What do we make of our past? How do we 
feel about our present? Are there missed opportunities, deep regrets, or unhealthy 
habits of the mind that we have adopted over time? Do we find moments of 
despair that unwillingly define our personal narratives? Nietzsche sees such 
consideration as an opportunity to evaluate how we feel about our lives and how 
we might begin to live differently. Literally speaking, the doctrine asks us to 
consider how would we feel if we were to relive our lives—full of the greatest to 
the most mundane details—eternally. Our answer to this question reveals our 
psychological state as well as the values we adopt. Written toward the end of his 
career, in Twilight of the Idols (TI) Nietzsche identifies himself as “the prophet of 
eternal recurrence” whose doctrine contains the means of “saying… Yea to 
life”—that is, the state where we would openly accept eternal recurrence (TI 120). 
In this same passage, he speaks of the capability of the doctrine to reconcile the 
individual with life’s “most strange and terrible problems” so that the “will to 
life” may begin “rejoicing” through an acquaintance with “its own 
inexhaustibleness” (TI 120). But how the doctrine produces this effect is left 
unsaid. In what follows, I will argue for a more complete reading of the doctrine 
based on a two-step process where a figurative weight of eternity can be applied 
to one’s life that has been broken down and considered through three distinct 
stages of recurrence. As such, I find an existential imperative within the doctrine 
that says that if we act as if eternal recurrence is true then we move through the 
stages of recurrence whereby we cultivate an attitude of acceptance and creation 
that allows us to overcome the state of inertia induced by the suffering of 
existence.1  
However, this reading alone lacks proper context. Nietzsche also identifies 
himself as the “last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus,” a detail which has 
received little attention in the scholarship (TI 120). He clarifies that he began this 
discipleship in “Birth of Tragedy…[his] first transvaluation of all values” (TI 
120). I maintain that we ought to take these claims seriously and re-read the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence in light of the aesthetics of Dionysus given in The 
Birth of Tragedy (BT) and likewise look for the ways in which BT motivates the 
doctrine. In other words, I want to show how the doctrine seems to follow 
naturally from Nietzsche’s discipleship of Dionysian philosophy. As such, I find 
that BT outlines the decline of values in Western society when confronted with 
                                                     
1 The word “overcome” has particular connotations for Nietzsche, especially regarding suffering. 
Whereas commonsense definitions of “overcome” involves something like “get over” or “go 
beyond,” Nietzsche’s usage involves a “going under” as much as it involves a “going over.” 
Nietzsche’s overcoming requires a working through and total acceptance of the suffering of 
existence before one can move on to acts of creation.  
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the problem of pessimism. Nietzsche first locates this decline in the death of 
Greek tragic art, which cultivates a spectator mindset. This spectator mindset 
spirals into greater decadent and life-denying tendencies cultivated by Platonic-
Christian philosophy. Nietzsche maintains that such philosophy fails to address 
the problem posed by pessimism and thus finds motivation for the doctrine. 
Through eternal recurrence, Nietzsche formulates a means by which we can 
overcome pessimism through a direct acquaintance with it. Like Greek tragic art, 
a serious consideration of eternal recurrence leads us to directly confront the pain 
of existence parallel to the Dionysian aesthetic impulse in tragic art. Ultimately, I 
argue that BT describes the conditions that necessitate the doctrine as well as 
provides the aesthetics of Dionysus that inform our understanding of the kind of 
attitude we ought to adopt to be reconciled with our past and move onward to a 
state of creation through which we can create new values.  
Apollonian-Dionysian Duality 
An analysis of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality in BT leads us to 
understand the aesthetics of Dionysus as a reconciliatory and creative force. This 
analysis nuances a figurative interpretation of eternal recurrence and illuminates 
the decline of the impulse in Greek tragic art and Western thought that leads to a 
pessimistic state of crisis. In the 1886 preface to BT, Nietzsche articulates the 
question which motivates his work: “The Greeks and pessimistic art? The Greeks: 
this most beautiful and accomplished, this thoroughly sane, universally envied 
species of man… Greek art: how did it function, how could it?” (BT 3). In this 
question, Nietzsche characterizes the Greek mode of existence as the ideal mode 
of existence insofar as they show an acquaintance with pessimism and a vital 
aesthetic relationship with it in the medium of tragic art. However, he also shows 
a disbelief or awe of this capability, which esteems the Greeks as “beautiful and 
accomplished” compared to other civilizations’ relationship with pessimism. As 
such, he wants to know what it is about the Greeks that allowed them to have this 
particularly vital stance toward pessimism: how could they aestheticize 
meaninglessness? In order to address this question, I want to first establish 
Nietzsche’s overall conception of tragedy as a means of confronting the 
meaninglessness and pain of existence which, in turn, leads to the aestheticization 
of life. Nietzsche identifies such an aestheticizing with the vitality which 
distinguishes the Greek in both their art and their way of life.  
Central to this view is the claim that “art owes its continuous evolution to 
the Apollonian-Dionysiac duality” (BT 19). By Apollonian and Dionysian, 
Nietzsche means the “antithetical artistic tendencies or impulses” operating as the 
“only genuine art impulses” (Silk and Stern 80, italics added). Nietzsche fails to 
explicate the origin of these concepts—or, how they are the only art impulses— in 
BT, but in later works, he characterizes them as “the bridge leading to the 
psychology of the tragic poet” (TI 120). Such a characterization suggests that the 
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Apollonian and Dionysian are projections of the human mind insofar as they are 
aesthetic tendencies requiring an aestheticizing mind. In a sense, then, the 
“Apollonian” and “Dionysian” are the particular psychological states motivating 
the artist. These psychological states have bearing on the external world insofar as 
they can be conditioned by an experience of reality or they can later condition 
human perception of reality. The former reinforces the conception of these 
impulses as psychological states as the artist experiences something, reacts to it, 
and thus finds inspiration for their work. The latter introduces a rather novel claim 
about the nature of art that it can be experienced and used to further shape 
experiences of reality. Thus, once conjured by the artist, the Apollonian and 
Dionysian are, in another sense, external to individuals. Though the Apollonian 
and Dionysian originate in the mind, now individuals may be affected by 
Apollonian or Dionysian art or by experiences they learn to identify as Apollonian 
or Dionysian. This distinction forms the basis for Nietzsche’s grand metaphysical 
claim that “it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified” insofar as individuals can constitute the world through the 
Apollonian or Dionysian or influence other interpretations of the world thereby 
(BT 52).  
These psychological states are further described as “the separate art realms 
of dream and intoxication” which highlights their antithesis and duality (BT 19). 
In the former, the dream realm is the breeding ground of “poetic creation” where 
“an apprehension of form… [and] all shapes” is made possible, albeit with a 
“residual sensation” of illusion. There is still the awareness of being in a dream as 
illusions pass before the mind (BT 20). In part, this residual feeling is a result of 
the limits of human knowledge. In “Fundamental Metaphors,” Michael Grenke 
rightly points out that, like Kant, Nietzsche gives an account of “experience of 
perception [as] mediated by forms imposed in things by humans themselves” 
(Grenke 5). In “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (TL), Nietzsche 
identifies this mediation as the workings of the human intellect, which is “aimless 
and arbitrary” (TL 79). Therefore, any use of the human intellect is, in this sense, 
an immersion in “illusions and dream images” even in waking life (TL 80). What 
more, this residual feeling arises from the artificial fairness or “perfection” of the 
dream illusions. Compared with the “imperfectly understood waking reality”—the 
reality onto which other, lackluster illusions are imposed—this dream world 
seems “‘lucent’” and full of “pleasant images” (BT 21). On one hand, the 
Apollonian can be identified as one of the “plastic energies” as the individual is 
not only removed from a direct encounter with whatever is captured in the dream 
image, but the dream image itself can only be perceived in this final manufactured 
form (BT 35). On the other hand, the Apollonian can also be identified with 
“healing powers during the interval of sleep” as it is through dreams that the body 
sleeps and rests (BT 21). Moreover, these two attributes work together insofar as 
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the perfection of the dream world offers an escape from the otherwise imperfect 
waking reality. No wonder then that Nietzsche finds the most apt embodiment of 
this aesthetic impulse in Apollo, “the soothsaying god…the god of light”; his 
“sunlike” eyes distinguish the forms and shapes which pass before our eyes and 
thereby make things intelligible in the dream realm, all the while restoring our 
bodies (BT 21). Such intelligibility is indicative of “the principium 
individuationis,” or the principle of individuation (BT 22). To illustrate this point, 
Nietzsche takes the example of a man caught in the middle of a raging tempest: 
“‘Even as on an immense, raging sea, assailed by huge wave crests, a man sits in 
a little rowboat trusting his frail craft, so, amidst the furious torments of this 
world, the individual sits tranquilly, supported by the [principle of individuation] 
and relying on it’” (BT 22). If this scenario is situated in the dream realm, the man 
caught in the storm might take pleasure in the fact that this is, in fact, a dream: as 
Nietzsche suggests, “Imagine that many persons have reassured themselves 
amidst the perils of dreams by calling out, ‘It is a dream! I want it to go on’” (BT 
21). But if it is situated beyond the dream realm—i.e., in the world proper—the 
man caught in the storm might take solace in his ability to discern the “huge wave 
crests” and “rowboat,” or, his capacity of intelligibility through individuation (BT 
21). At least, in this sense, the man does not experience the brute, “furious 
torments” of nature as unintelligible (BT 21). Thus, with the principle of 
individuation, the Apollonian displays its ontological power as both a 
psychological state and an external aesthetic phenomenon: things in both the 
dream world and waking reality can be made intelligible, packaged, and presented 
to the individual in determined form.  
As for the Dionysian, the realm of intoxication becomes more of an 
analogy than a single physiological state. Whereas the dream realm is a literal 
state that one enters (e.g., I sleep, I dream, I awake and take the residue of the 
dream state into the world of things), the realm of intoxication is indeterminate 
and may seize the individual at any turn. The term “intoxication” signals a family 
of expository terms and phrases: “rapture,” “stirrings,” “influence of narcotic 
potions,” “joy,” the singing of “hymns,” “powerful approach of spring,” “rite” 
(BT 22-23). The realm of intoxication speaks more to the art of a general 
movement, an emotion, a seizure of the individual rather than any one state or 
realm. Already, then, by its very description, the Dionysian is antithetical to the 
Apollonian insofar as it eludes the principle of individuation that would clearly 
define it in a fixed, singular way. This antithesis is heightened when Nietzsche 
claims that intoxication first arises from a failure of Apollonian illusions. As 
“doubt” is introduced into “the cognitive modes of experience” there is, indeed, a 
“shattering of the [principle of individuation]” (BT 22). The occasion giving rise 
to doubt might be empirical, i.e., I see something that my illusions cannot account 
for; it might be psychological, i.e., I falter in my certainty and therein the raw 
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force of nature slips in; it might be a byproduct of the illusions themselves, i.e., 
illusions are limited in their ability to capture phenomena. Nietzsche is not clear 
on the matter, but he maintains that once individuation fails, a “tremendous awe” 
takes hold and produces “the vision of mystical Oneness” (BT 23). While the 
Apollonian allows for an individuation of phenomena through intelligibility, the 
Dionysian is the state induced when the individual confronts the barrage of 
unintelligible phenomena. The “closest analogy [to this latter realm] is furnished 
by physical intoxication”: just as my faculty of reason and judgment maintain 
order in my normal waking reality, the influence of “narcotic potions” or the 
wellspring of vitality felt with the “approach of spring” can move me to become 
insensible, giddy, and move with “Dionysiac rapture” (BT 22).  
The latter description marks a shift in language from terror to bliss which 
reveals the reconciliatory and creative power of Dionysus. “So stirred the 
individual forgets himself completely” so that he may join with “ever increasing 
crowds” of likewise un-individuated people and begin “singing and dancing from 
place to place” (BT 22). Ontologically, lacking the ability of individuation, the 
individual unifies and merges into a larger body of intoxicants. The larger body 
still lacks the power of individuation. Thus, it increases in magnitude and finally 
dissolves into “nature itself,” which “rises again to celebrate the reconciliation 
with her prodigal son, man” (BT 23). To return to the earlier example, then, in the 
state of intoxication, the man on the rowboat no longer distinguishes himself from 
the storm. Rather, the waves rise and join him in a unified whole and the man 
basks in the rapture of nature. Man and storm form complete, un-individuated 
phenomenon. With this merger, “the vision of the mystical Oneness” of existence 
is revealed: there really is no true metaphysical distinction between the individual 
and surrounding phenomena. Both the man and the storm form the aesthetic 
phenomena of life (BT 23). Thus, the Dionysian reconciles the individual through 
merging and dissolution and, finally, ends in a creative force which likewise may 
continue to merge, dissolve, and thereby form new phenomena.   
When the Dionysian is identified with bliss, its true tension with itself and 
the Apollonian becomes all the more clear. In one sense, the Dionysian is 
terrifying: the raw experience of existence is confronted without any cognizing 
faculties. In another sense, the Dionysian is, indeed, blissful: the individual moves 
closer to the experience of all things and thus is harmonized with them. 
Alternatively, in another sense, the Apollonian is illuminating: it clearly defines 
the form of things thus allowing for cognition and understanding. In another 
sense, the Apollonian is obscuring: as it individuates, it divorces objects and thus 
makes them strange. Therefore, within each impulse, there is an initial tension. 
This inner tension is mirrored in the outer tension, which in turns characterizes the 
duality. Taken together, the Apollonian restricts the Dionysian and eliminates the 
necessary fear of raw experience; simultaneously, the Apollonian prevents a 
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unification of the individual with nature. The Dionysian forces an experience of 
tremendous awe of sheer phenomena; simultaneously, the Dionysian eliminates 
individuality so that it is unclear in what sense an individual may remain an 
affected individual. Thus, the Apollonian and Dionysian contain their own 
respective duality that is then mirrored in the harmonizing of the two impulses. 
But neither force overcomes the other insofar as they are both human aesthetic 
impulses, which is exemplified in the innovations of Greek art. 
The particular innovations of the dithyrambic satyr chorus and the tragic 
hero signify how the Apollonian and Dionysian form a unity out of this inner and 
outer duality. To turn first to the satyr chorus, Nietzsche maintains that tragedy 
springs “out of the tragic chorus,” which in turn is composed of “the satyr, as the 
Dionysiac chorist” (BT 47-50). Therefore, if the satyr embodies both the 
Apollonian and Dionysian, then tragic art necessarily embodies the Apollonian 
and the Dionysian. Superficially, the satyr appears as “an enthusiastic reveler…a 
compassionate companion re-enacting the sufferings of the god [Dionysus]; a 
prophet of wisdom born out of nature’s womb; a symbol of sexual 
omnipotence…sublime and divine” (BT 52). Though this characterization sounds 
like the satyr is solely a Dionysian innovation, it also contains elements of the 
Apollonian. The satyr is a mythic image pulled down from the heavens and made 
intelligible before the audience; though its appearance may invoke thoughts of 
nature, sexual potency, and jubilee, it is, in fact, artifice. However, the satyr is not 
image alone but is simultaneously musical artifice—it is a chorus. Underpinning 
the notion of chorist is Nietzsche’s quasi-metaphysical account that music 
“manifests itself as will,” or, rather, it “appears as the will” (BT 45). Music itself 
is quintessentially the aesthetic expression of the Apollonian-Dionysian duality: 
the musician must “employ the whole register of emotions, from the whisper of 
love to the roar of frenzy; moved to talk of music in Apollonian similitudes, he 
must first comprehend the whole range of nature” (BT 45). The sheer movement 
and affect of music finds its only analog in the will, which is first and foremost a 
Dionysian force that seizes man with a tremendous awe. But the form of that 
music is still Apollonian: it is encased in structured notes, chords, and melodies. 
Thus, the satyr chorus engages in music-making and thereby channels the 
Apollonian while also having this further aesthetic capability of the Dionysian 
wherein man is brought closer to nature both in appearance and affect; the 
Apollonian and Dionysian are unified. As such, as the tragic is born out of the 
satyr chorus, and the satyr chorus is fundamentally Apollonian and Dionysian, 
tragedy likewise must be both Apollonian and Dionysian.  
However, the satyr chorus merely conditions the arrival of the tragic hero, 
which stands as the fully embodied image of the Apollonian and Dionysian. Note 
that the purpose of the satyr chorus is to “excite the mood of listeners [so] that 
when the tragic hero appeared they would behold not the awkwardly masked man 
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but a figure born of their own rapt vision” (BT 58). As the ancient audiences revel 
along in the musical will of the satyr chorus, they are conditioned to nature, the 
joy, the suffering, and so on. However, when Oedipus, Prometheus, or Orestes 
steps out on stage, the crowd perceives this hero along with the conditioned 
phenomena: the audience can now engage with the tragic hero as they have 
engaged with the satyr chorus—that is, on the level of the will. This analysis 
shows the ingeniousness and interdependence of the innovations of Attic tragedy. 
Without something like the satyr chorus to move the audience into the emotion 
sphere of the tragic mood, the literal appearance of the tragic hero on the stage—
inevitably bound by the Apollonian form of masks, garb, general appearance— 
would indeed be awkward (or, worse, comedic, satirical, sheer buffoonery) and 
thereby diminish the intended tragic effect. More importantly, the tragic hero 
would be solely masked in the Apollonian. It would lack the emotional thrust 
necessary to engage the audience in the tragic will; it would stand solely as 
artifice. With the intelligibility of its Apollonian form on the stage and its 
intelligible, eloquent speech coupled with the phenomenal flow of Dionysian will 
conditioned by the satyr, the tragic hero can then reveal tragic knowledge that 
confronts the audience with “the unvarnished expression of the truth” (BT 61).  
The expression of truth via the tragic hero moves the audience closer to 
the “essence of things” whereby the audience can then understand, reconcile, and 
thereby overcome pessimism (BT 60). As the Dionysian has been conditioned on 
the stage via the satyr chorus, any utterance of the tragic hero will be a 
development of the Dionysian. Thus, through this conditioning the audience is 
“forced to recognize real beings in the figures on the stage” as the tragic hero 
appears—this is a real individual experiencing real things that likewise can affect 
the spectator (BT 57). However, that status of “spectator” is also transformed 
insofar as these figures appear real: the stage has been transformed into life along 
with all its pain and misery experienced by the tragic hero, and, like the music of 
the satyr chorus, the audience is transported along with this tragic will. With the 
power of Apollonian intelligibility, the tragic hero can now enunciate and clearly 
articulate the “horror or absurdity of existence” (BT 60). Such a performance not 
only communicates the possibility of such horror via intelligible communication, 
it also actualizes it as the audience moves along with the suffering tragic hero now 
fully experiencing the pangs of existence; the suffering of the tragic hero becomes 
real and thereby communicates the suffering of existence.  
In this dual communication of both the possibility of the tragic and the 
experience of the tragic, the tragic hero also fulfills the power of tragic art by 
which “art saves” through a reconciliation with pessimism and a creative 
overcoming of it (BT 59). Now affected by the reality of the suffering of the tragic 
hero, the audience likewise suffers with him and attains that same divine 
“knowledge” of life (BT 60). This knowledge is that of the extent of suffering 
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humans are subject to; it is a knowledge of the inability for humans to avoid pain 
and suffering despite our efforts through the use of reason, imposed structures, 
predictions, and intelligibility. As such, it becomes clear why this art must then be 
tragic: only the tragic art presents the audience with the suffering of the tragic 
hero whereby they can then understand that suffering. This account seems to 
confirm Aristotle’s analysis of tragedy as essentially cathartic where an 
experience of “incidents arousing pity and fear” through art conditions better 
equips the audience to experience those emotions in the world (Aristotle 2320). 
But this catharsis has a further reach for Nietzsche. Here, catharsis is more 
accurately described as reconciliation as it is through tragic awareness that the 
audience confronts the suffering of existence. Though art initially aims at 
imitating life, tragic art places the audience in proximity of suffering whereby 
they too can experience it as a matter of fact. What more, dramatic actualization 
provides the audience with an opportunity to overcome that pessimism through a 
further aesthetic creation. Recall that the primary effect of the Dionysian is 
intoxication and rapture: now faced with the horrors of existence, the individual 
may descend into the depths of that horror and thereby form a new chorus. The 
meaning of the “mystical vision of the Oneness of existence” becomes clear: the 
individual may choose to dissolve into suffering and dance along with the other 
phenomena of life (most readily embodied in the tragic chorus) (BT 23). In that 
possibility of reconciliation and creation, I find an answer to the question posed in 
the preface to BT. Greek pessimistic art is made possible through the union of the 
Apollonian and Dionysian impulses—the duality of dreams and intoxication—and 
this aesthetic phenomenon moves the audience closer to the mystical oneness of 
existence. This movement is cultivated by a conditioning of the tragic will via the 
satyr chorus and the appearance of the tragic hero which actualizes that tragic 
will. In that performance, the audience becomes reconciled with the pain and 
suffering of existence and joins with the chorus to form out of that pain a new 
state of song and dance. Thus, with tragic art leading to Dionysian vitality, 
Grecian society directly confronted, became reconciled with, and overcame the 
awareness of pessimism.  
 
The Decline of Greek Art and Socratic Influence 
Contrary to this vitality, Nietzsche marks a decline in tragic art with the 
aesthetic innovations of Euripides and the philosophical influence of Socrates. I 
argue that these developments cultivate a passive spectator mindset that prefigures 
the decadence and life-denying tendencies of Western philosophy, which will 
motivate the formulation of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Before actually 
delving into how Euripides engages with the “death struggle of tragedy” 
Nietzsche addresses the poet directly: “And because you had abandoned 
Dionysus, Apollo abandoned you” (BT 76, 75). This critique reiterates just how 
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strongly the Apollonian is tied to the Dionysian. Moreover, this comment 
prefigures the greater argument Nietzsche anticipates, the “immense void” that 
will be left in the wake of the decline (BT 75). If Euripides forsakes the 
Dionysian, he forsakes the Apollonian. Without the Dionysian and Apollonian, 
there is no art. Without art, man cannot be reconciled with life. Without 
reconciliation with life, man will not know how to respond to the paralysis 
induced by pessimism. Without knowing how to respond to pessimism, man will 
despair. Finally, in despair, society will suffer from a lack of vitality.  
Euripides’ chief innovation is deceptively simple: he “brought the 
spectator onto the stage” (BT 77). The italicizing of the word “spectator” suggests 
that already Nietzsche thinks of Euripides’ innovation not as a direct merger of 
the audience with the events of the play but the development of a particular kind 
of figure that can be isolated as spectator. As such, this merger of audience with 
stage will not be the same merger caused by the satyr chorus inspired by the 
Dionysian impulse. Rather, this merge will be superficial, devoid of the true fruit 
of “the gardens of music” in exchange for “only copied, masked music” (BT 75). 
Nietzsche reiterates this language of “masked” throughout his description of 
Euripides’ aesthetics, suggesting a sense of removal or artificiality (BT 75-77). On 
the one hand, this description develops the notion that Euripides’ art is an art 
without the Dionysian; it can only be Apollonian forms, figures, and shapes on 
the stage, mere masks of emotion without the emotion of the Dionysian. On the 
other hand, by Nietzsche’s earlier qualification, this description suggests that 
Euripides’ art is even more artificial insofar as it cannot have the Apollonian 
without the Dionysian. Thus, Euripides’ art is a sort of play of bastardized 
imitations; even its representations through the Apollonian are, in fact, 
counterfeit. This talk of masks becomes especially pertinent when elaborating on 
Euripides’ use of character. For Nietzsche, the heroes of the Euripidean stage 
“have only copied, masked passions and speak only copied mask speeches” so 
that they lack the same reconciliatory power of the earlier tragic hero (BT 76). But 
Nietzsche sees the situation as even more grave because Euripides perverts the 
notion of the hero all together through this initial placement of the spectator on 
the stage. The hero is replaced by the “everyday man” so that the “spectator now 
actually saw and heard his double on the stage, and he rejoiced that he could talk 
so well” (BT 77).2 The spectator subverts the hero and dominates the 
representation of life on the stage. However, the actual spectator is still removed 
from this image of “his double”; the spectator is still firmly distanced as a 
spectator wherein he can listen to his double “talk so well” (BT 77). More 
insidiously, then, the only power of the Euripidean stage is to play with this 
                                                     
2 This notion of the everyday man replacing the tragic hero prefigures Nietzsche’s critique of the 
herd mentality explored throughout GS, Z, and GM.  
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“mask of reality” until the spectator really believes he perceives himself on the 
stage and thus “learns…how to speak oneself” from the image on the stage (BT 
77). Thus, the full meaning of spectator becomes clear: on the Euripidean stage, 
the Dionysian is removed to shift the focus entirely onto the Apollonian. The 
spectator is not moved by any greater aesthetic will but remains firmly removed 
from the events of the play. Moreover, as the spectator sees his own image on the 
stage, he is mesmerized by this mask of reality and assumes the passive role of 
recipient—how different from the active individual dissolving and participating in 
the Dionysian phenomena of the older tragedy! And in this passive role, the 
spectator cannot even speak: he merely listens to his self-image on the stage and 
learns to speak by him. Ultimately, then, Euripides’ placement of the spectator on 
the stage ironically reinforces the status of the spectator, a passive role which does 
not participate in the greater aesthetic movement but remains dumb and dull.  
In actuality this innovation is born out of a misunderstanding and recourse 
to a strictly anti-Dionysian strain of philosophical thinking. In “the works of 
Aeschylus and Sophocles” Euripides encounters the “mysterious depth, an infinite 
background” of Dionysus (BT 75). Though Euripides readily sees the “clearest 
figure” of Apollo in the images of Aeschylus and Sophocles (one thinks of the 
masks, the characters, the discourse that readily delighted Greek audiences), he 
cannot make sense of the “comet’s tail” trailing the lucid figure “which seemed to 
point to something uncertain, something that could not be wholly elucidated”—
namely, the Dionysian (BT 75). However, as Euripides is still an artist, he must 
find a solution to the aesthetic problem posed by the Dionysian and thus attempts 
to “rebuild the drama on a foundation of non-Dionysiac art, custom, and 
philosophy” (BT 76). Formally, this means that the art will “no longer be begotten 
by music” (BT 77). Philosophically, this means a commitment exclusively to the 
pseudo-Apollonian. All that remains on the stage are those masks of reality, thus 
identifying the “beautiful” with exclusively the “sensible’” (BT 79). However, this 
identification is not truly Apollonian so much as it is anti-Dionysian. Recall that 
without the Dionysian, art cannot also contain the Apollonian. Thus, the 
Euripidean art is left with the mere devices of the Apollonian, namely the literal 
forms and images on the stage. As such, this is more of an intellectual appeal on 
behalf of Euripides, one that by definition does not contain either the Dionysian or 
the true Apollonian. Ultimately, then, Euripides’ art requires very different 
“deity” for aesthetic justification: the “newborn demon, called Socrates” (BT 82).  
Like Euripides, Socrates cannot make sense of older tragedy and thus 
overhauls the initial aesthetic impulses to make way for his system of rationality, 
which only further solidifies the spectator mindset throughout society. To 
overcome the mystery of Dionysus, Socrates privileges what he takes to be the 
opposite tendency, a “prestige of knowledge and conscious intelligence” (BT 83). 
This would have the effect of removing the Dionysian out of art all together, 
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which leaves Greek art “entirely destroyed” (BT 89). But recall that this also 
would remove the Apollonian such that, in effect, “Socratism condemns existing 
art” (BT 87). Thus, really, Socrates’ move isn’t simply to venerate the Apollonian 
over the Dionysian. Rather, it is to change to consideration of values from the 
aesthetic to the rational such that “knowledge alone makes men virtuous,” or man 
is reconciled not through art but through reason. Really, then, the Apollonian is 
“disguised as logical schematism” as Socrates enforces strict logic and reason to 
better discern intelligible things and ameliorate the state of affairs. As such, 
reason becomes the key for overcoming pessimism by the Socratic account.  
 Such veneration of knowledge, so-called truth, and reason obviously does 
not sit well with Nietzsche. His earlier work, TL, gives an account of “how 
aimless and arbitrary the human intellect” is: “There were eternities during which 
it did not exist. And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have 
happened. For this intellect has no additional mission which would lead it beyond 
human life” (TL 79). Not only is Nietzsche’s disenchantment with reason 
evidenced in this passage, but also there is a metaphysical deflation of the human 
mind. Human reason is reduced to a means of “preserving the individual”; it is 
taken down from the realm of virtue and beauty and identified with nature (TL 
80). Obviously, this conflicts with the Socratic account: whereas wisdom is that 
which allows humans to aspire beyond a state of ignorance or unintelligibility, for 
Nietzsche wisdom is merely a faculty of ignorant and unintelligible nature. There 
is no metaphysical insight to be had. Moreover, “the art of dissumlation”—that is, 
the art of cultivating intellect—is in fact identified as “deception, flattering, lying, 
deluding, talking behind the back, hiding behind convention, playing a role for 
others and oneself… [a deep immersion] in illusions and dream images” (TL 80). 
Therefore, for Nietzsche, Socratic wisdom is reducible to “play on words, a 
grammatical seduction, or an audacious generalization” (BGE 31). And such a 
play on words is a far cry from the reconciliatory powers of Greek tragic art. The 
individual is left suspended in this world of language and falsities rather than 
actually engaging with the suffering of life or the “apparent” world at all. Thus, 
not only is the basis of Socratic truth faulty, it further cultivates that same 
semblance of removal, or the spectator state, seen in the Euripidean tragedy.  
 Nonetheless, Nietzsche sees a greater danger of cultivating decadent and 
life-denying values through Socratic wisdom. Evans rightly argues that for 
Nietzsche “a decadent [is] one who is misled by a single… drive into 
psychological, moral, and physiological decline through the worship of ideas that 
are nihilistic and inimical to life” (Evans 342). In Socrates, I find such a decadent: 
his reaction to worship reason ultimately leads to a degeneracy of life that, in fact, 
maintains the initial degeneracy he tried to “remedy” in the first place (TI 14). But 
beyond the critique offered in TL, if I can prove that Socrates’ remedy is, in fact, 
in error, then I can claim that it is a dogma. And if it can be shown that Socrates’ 
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veneration of reason is, in fact, a dogma, then I can rightly claim that he is 
decadent on the grounds that he clings to his remedy despite its falsity. Moreover, 
I will take this critique further by satisfying the condition that reason is to be 
identified with an idea that is “nihilistic and inimical to life” so that it may be 
truly said to be decadent and life-denying (Evans 342).  
The Socratic formulation that “Reason = Virtue = Happiness” errs in that 
it seeks to assess the “value of life” rather than “assigning value to [Socrates’ 
own] life” (TI 12, Evans 342). First, I start from the epistemic constraint that 
“judgements and valuations of life…cannot be true” insofar as “their only value 
lies in the fact that they are symptoms” (TI 10). In other words, judgments and 
valuations of life are, in fact, metaphysically stunted because there is no vantage 
point on life by which life can be evaluated; individuals are a “contending party” 
in life and thus cannot be “a judge” of it (TI 10). Therefore, it may be said that 
“the value of life cannot be estimated”; at best, one can only speak to the value of 
their individual life (or, more realistically, some fraction of it). This accords with 
the epistemology offered in TL: our reasoned evaluations of our subjective lives 
hold insofar as they are limited to our subjective lives. These valuations can never 
aspire to something beyond.  
Accordingly, in the Socratic formulation, there is an overreaching of 
evaluation. Socrates can be read as “symptomatic” for his own life—more of a 
projection than a proper evaluation, at that (Evans 342). And what might produce 
the symptoms that leads Socrates to venerate reason? The world-weariness 
Socrates experiences is not being able to understand and thereby reconcile with 
the suffering of existence. Nietzsche revisits one episode in particular to highlight 
the world-weariness of Socrates: his famous last words of the Phaedo: “O Crito, I 
owe Asclepius a rooster” (GS 272). In TI this becomes: “To live—means to be ill 
a long while: I owe a cock to the god Asclepius” (TI 9). As noted by Kaufmann, 
Evans, Stern et. al. Asclepius is the god of medicine. Nietzsche claims that these 
famous last words are tantamount to Socrates proclaiming, “O Crito, life is a 
disease” (GS 272). In other words, “sacrificing the rooster [to Ascelpius] is what 
you do when you get better. Getting better from the sickness that is life means 
leaving it” (Stern 81). However, the actual intent of the last words is ambiguous. 
It is not contestable that Socrates sees death as a cure for life; but, in doing so, has 
he inadvertently rejected the whole project of promoting reason? Stern offers an 
illuminating commentary on this: “Socrates repeatedly denigrates this-worldly 
values. He is in a good position to do so, after all, having just proved the 
immortality of the soul” (Stern 80). It is not that Socrates contradicts his entire 
project in denying life; rather, it shows that Socrates conceives of reason as, in 
fact, other-worldly. Nietzsche parodies this view: “‘We must already once have 
lived in a higher world, we must have been divine, for we possess reason!” (TI 
22). And thus Socratic philosophy can be identified with the first great epoch in 
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Nietzsche’s “The History of An Error”: “1. The true world, attainable to the sage, 
the pious and the man of virtue, —he lives in it, he is it” (TI 24). Here, Socrates is 
the sage, the pious, and the man of virtue in that he practices reason. Reason 
allows him to access virtue, which entails happiness. Thus construed, reason is the 
means by which to access “the true world” (TI 24). The illness suffered, then, is 
not necessarily life in and of itself but life as identified with lack of reason. The 
cure for this illness is death, which is identified with reason as it is diametrically 
opposed to this untrue world i.e., the world that holds us back from attaining pure 
reason, virtue, and happiness. And this analysis makes sense in light of the 
commonplace understanding of Socrates: one must practice reason in order to 
orient their soul toward the Heaven of the Forms as opposed to remaining 
ignorant and at the level of the body. And, yet, recall that this evaluation of life 
cannot be an evaluation of all lives, though, this is exactly what Socrates wants it 
to be. Socrates has attempted to create value for life overall, namely by positing 
another world to aspire to through the use of reason. But in doing so, he has 
merely conjured up a moral edict that, in fact, cannot stand as such. At best, 
Socrates can only evaluate his own life i.e., create his own values. But here he has 
promoted “the instinct of degeneration itself: it says: ‘Perish!’” in order to obtain 
the cure wherein we too can offer a rooster to Asclepius (TI 31). Thus, in this final 
weariness, that initial spectator-state transforms into a life lived according to 
reason and thus requires a rejection of life (in order to properly transcend the 
limits of the body). And, really, this amounts to the ultimate spectator state: 
Socrates aspires to be distanced from life to the extremity of departing from it all 
together wherein he might have a vantage point to properly assess it.  
This analysis shows Socrates’ veneration of reason to be dogmatic in that 
it poses as an evaluation of life when such a value cannot be estimated. 
Furthermore, I have shown that this dogma is produced by Socrates’ own world-
weariness in that he sees reason as other-worldly and life itself as a mere 
impediment to that other-world. Thus, I conclude that Socrates is decadent insofar 
as he relies on a particular drive—namely, his inability to understand the 
Dionysian—to promote reason even though it leads him to deny life. Ultimately, 
then, Nietzsche is right to “[recognize] Socrates and Plato as symptoms of 
decline, as instruments of disintegration”: Socrates promotes a decadent ideology 
that in fact proliferates a degeneration, leads to a decline in Greek art, and 
promotes a philosophy of life-denial which leads to the crisis of pessimism (TI 
10).  
However, the scope of this decline is still unpronounced. I turn to 
Platonism to show the scope of the problem of Socrates. It is not difficult to 
equate the philosophy of Socrates with Platonism. After all, really, Plato takes up 
the “old moral problem” of “reason” versus unintelligibility and merely refines it 
through the Forms (BGE 114). However, Plato’s contribution is to take the 
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philosophy of Socrates and present it in the “new genre” of “Platonic dialogue” 
(BT 87). This “mixture of all the available styles and forms…hovered between 
narrative, lyric, drama, between prose and poetry” and thereby broke “through the 
old law of stylistic unity” (BT 87). On the one hand, this new form is the vessel 
through which “the shipwrecked older poetry saved itself” (BT 87). On the other 
hand, this new form is still guided by the “helmsman Socrates” and, in fact, 
exemplifies the very “total chaos within” wherein “Reason is just his means of 
keeping that chaos at bay” (BT 87, Nehemas 139). Platonic dialogue form 
proliferates Socratic philosophy whilst embodying the very chaos resulting in the 
Socratic denial of life i.e., the necessity of reason. The greatest effect of Platonism 
is even more pronounced in its evolution: “Plato…wanted at the expenditure of all 
his strength…to prove to himself that reason and instinct move of themselves 
toward one goal, towards the good, towards ‘God’; and since Plato all theologians 
and philosophers have followed the same path” (BGE 114). In other words, Plato 
preserves his masters teachings and thereby cultivates the paradigm shift from 
Greek aestheticism to Idealism (and with it, the development of Western 
metaphysics, the paradigm of reason as the primary tool of the philosopher, the 
mistake of making false estimates of the value of life, etc.). From this paradigm 
follows “Platonism for ‘the people,’” the next great epoch in the great error of 
humanity: Christianity.   
 
The Death of God: Critique of Christianity and Pessimism 
 In Christianity, Nietzsche finds the worst aspects of Socratic philosophy 
fulfilled: a robust account of morality that proliferates 
“declining…enfeebled…exhausted…condemned” values (TI 31). It seems 
redundant to speak directly about Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. Nearly all 
his works feature some disparaging remarks on the religion, and there are at least 
three volumes solely dedicated to direct attacks, namely Daybreak, On the 
Genealogy of Morality, and The Antichrist. Alternatively, I want to emphasize the 
quality of values inherent in Christianity i.e., those that are life-denying, such that 
they mark a continued decline in vitality following Platonism. What more, since 
Nietzsche accepts that Christianity is the predominant ideology of Western 
society, Western society can now be situated in this state of decline which 
motivates the formulation of the doctrine of eternal recurrence.  
 Christianity is analogous to Platonism in that it is equally dogmatic. I have 
already argued for the views of Socrates as essentially dogmatic; the joint force of 
Socrates and Plato rest their philosophy on an assumption of knowledge, truth, 
and reason that is ultimately unfounded. And so the general critique for 
dogmatism is that it presents “not simply a view but [a so-called] accurate 
description of the real world which forces its own acceptance and makes an 
unconditional claim on everyone’s assent”—that is, the dogma “commands 
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universal assent” simply by claiming to be some greater philosophy of the actual 
world, namely a world which itself is subordinate the otherworld of the Heaven of 
the Forms accessible by reason, and so on (Nehamas 32, 34). Nietzsche locates an 
equally dogmatic philosophy in “the Christian teaching, which is, and wants to be, 
only moral” (BT, Kaufmann 23). This designation as “only moral” holds great 
interpretive weight for Nietzsche. Recall that Nietzsche’s major philosophical 
work is to go “beyond good and evil” insofar as he sees all “customary value-
sentiments” as “false judgements” based on the “fictions of logic” (BGE 36). As a 
moral philosophy, then, Christianity simply will not do for Nietzsche; it too stems 
from the dogma of reason founded in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato. And 
this seems evident enough: in the Christian worldview, the Platonic quest for 
knowledge becomes the quest for understanding of God; the dialectics of Socrates 
becomes the dialectics of good and evil, of heaven and hell. While this may seem 
over-generalizing or equivocal, fundamentally, Christianity is philosophy done in 
a way Nietzsche argues strictly against—that is, it “commands universal assent” 
by claiming special knowledge of the world as is, namely a world in a fallen state 
requiring the grace of God for salvation (Nehamas 34).  
More importantly, the analogy between Christianity and Platonism holds 
in that both advocate life-denying philosophies based in other-wordliness. It’s 
worth noting that Nietzsche claims that he “never failed to sense a hostility to life” 
present in Christianity,” a suspicion that can be inferred from the “careful and 
hostile silence” with which it is treated in BT (BT 23). In the same way that 
Socrates would attempt to ameliorate life on the grounds of its sickness—that is, 
its status as unintelligible—Christianity would ameliorate life because it “must 
continually and inevitably be in the wrong, because life is something essentially 
amoral” (BT, Kaufmann 23). As Christa Davis Acampora rightly points out, first 
off, such a philosophy “springs from a fundamentally pessimistic worldview”—
that is, the world is in a state of decline or suffering, it requires divine intervention 
(of knowledge or God) for salvation (Acampora 31). Moreover, then, “to seek the 
obliteration of suffering… is at the same time to seek the destruction of life” 
(Acampora 31). This desire to destroy life can perhaps best be seen in the 
denigration of physical life—the life of the body and bodily pleasures— 
throughout Platonic and Judeo-Christian literature. The individual must transcend 
the desires of their body to orient their soul with the good, and the Son of Christ 
must sacrifice literal body on the Cross to transcend into the heavenly body (with 
mankind to follow his spiritual lead). Furthermore, this life-denial is presented in 
the positing of other, supposedly better worlds. As Nietzsche outlines in “How the 
‘True World’ Ultimately Became a Fable” there is a movement from the Platonic 
view that “the true world” of knowledge is “attainable to the sage, the pious man 
and the man of virtue” insofar as reason may be used to attain it (TI 24). This 
evolves ever-so slightly into the Christian view that “the true world is unattainable 
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for the moment, is promised to the sage, to the pious man and to the man of virtue 
(‘to the sinner who repents’)” (TI 24). Both views denigrate life for a supposed 
“true world” and in doing so “negates, judges, and damns art” (TI 24, BT, 
Kaufmann 23). It is evident, then, that Christianity (along with Platonism, of 
course) spells out “a will to negate life” in stark contradiction to the Greek 
“saying of Yea to life” (BT, Kaufmann23, TI 120). Whereas Greek art would 
reconcile us to this life (to the mysteries of the pain and beauty of this existence), 
Christianity would reject such an art in lieu of moral tenants, which, again, for 
Nietzsche are untenable in the first place. And as Christianity is “Platonism for 
‘the people’” (or, “Platonism for the masses,” as it is often translated), the wide-
reaching effects of Christianity for Western society are obvious enough (BGE 32). 
“Morality” as developed from Christianity “is…today herd-animal morality”—
people proclaim to know “what is good and evil” despite these erroneous 
foundations (BGE 124-125). This morality is founded on an essentially 
pessimistic and life-denying philosophy antithetical to the vitality exhibited first 
among the Greeks. “The Christian resolve to find the world ugly and bad has 
made the world ugly and bad,” and Western society has inherited that worldview 
(GS 185).  
Ironically, this same confrontation with pessimism is what motivates 
Nietzsche’s own formulation of eternal recurrence. First off, there is the well-
documented awakening Nietzsche felt upon first encountering the great 
pessimistic works of Arthur Schopenhauer. And the very language of the 
necessary pain of existence throughout BT and TI suggests that Nietzsche 
maintains “suffering is a fundamental condition of life” (Acampora 31). What 
more, in BGE Nietzsche admits his project is, in part, to “think pessimism through 
to the bottom and to redeem it” (BGE 82). But what is Nietzsche to redeem 
pessimism from? For one, Nietzsche wants to redeem pessimism from the bad 
solutions posed by Socratic and Christian ideology. I have just shown how 
Platonism and Christianity posit illusory, decadent, dogmatic life-denying 
philosophies. Accordingly, they lead to a decline in vitality, or a rejection of this 
life in attempting to ameliorate the suffering. More importantly, Nietzsche wants 
to redeem philosophy from the loss of meaning and values. Again, consider the 
extent to which Platonism and Christianity has influenced the values of Western 
society. I agree with Heidegger’s analysis: 
Two thousand years’ worth of tradition have made them habitual 
for our ways of representing things. Such habituation remains 
definitive even when we are far from thinking about Plato’s 
original philosophy, and also when the Christian faith has expired, 
leaving in place notions that are utterly conformable to reasons, 
notions of an “almighty” ruler of the universe and a 
“providence”…Nietzsche posits these modes of thoughts as the 
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fundamental earmark of Western thinking as such and of the entire 
history of Western thought (Heidegger 7).  
Thus, in overturning the Platonic and Christian solutions to pessimism, Nietzsche 
is effectively overturning nearly the whole of Western thought, and most certainly 
the thought of “the people” (or the masses) (BGE 32). Therefore, in order to 
reconcile his rebuttal of the two dominant solutions to pessimism while retaining 
his own pessimistic stance, Nietzsche offers a new solution by which we can 
create meaning in the world. Consider all that is lost in the refutation of the 
Socratic and the Christian: we can longer use reason to learn about and thereby 
aspire to the good; we no longer have the means to distinguish between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ solely on the basis of knowledge; we lack the metaphysical 
underpinnings, the greater cosmological scheme, by which we validate our 
existence in the light of God; we no longer have the surefire moral judgements by 
which we can act for ‘good’ or ‘evil; we lose our means of judging things as 
valuable; and, we lose our means of giving meaning to our lives. Nietzsche 
anticipates this loss of meaning in his portrayal of the death of god:  
“Whither is God?” he cried; “I will tell you. We have killed him — 
you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? 
How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe 
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained 
this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we 
moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? 
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up 
or down? Are we not straying, as through an infinite nothing? Do 
we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? 
Is not night continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light 
lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of the noise of 
the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as 
yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is 
dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him…How shall we 
comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?... Must we 
ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?” (GS 
181-182).  
This isn’t an antichristian tirade so much as it an acknowledgement of 
disillusionment, of bewilderment, and of deep anxiety. The question is not 
whether god is dead. Nietzsche himself has already refuted the major tents of 
religious faith and believes that in modernity there are only “those who [do] not 
believe in God” in any meaningful sense and the “tombs and sepulchers” 
represented by the impotent church. Rather, Nietzsche is concerned with what we 
are left to do in the fallout of the death of god: “How shall we comfort ourselves,” 
how might we “clean ourselves” of the death of god, “what festivals” or “games 
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shall we invent” to restore our vigor, and what spiritual apparatus will allow us to 
“become gods” to properly account for our movement away from the 
metaphysical positions inherent in a belief in god (GS 181-182)? While we are 
left to sort through these questions, we cannot help but acknowledge that 
existence has “become cold,” that we lack a certain “sun” to revolve around and 
give us our cause, that we seem to be aimlessly “straying, as through an infinite 
nothing” (GS 181-182). This characterization is tantamount to a state of crisis: we 
have lost the former source of our values and the former means by which we 
could create meaning in the world which. More importantly, these values were, 
indeed, our solutions to suffering. We are left with a certain void, a certain 
baseline of pessimism “that life, can never give real satisfaction and hence is not 
worthy of our affection” and that our old values (Platonism, Christianity, etc.) can 
no longer account for (BT 24). Yet, this juncture offers the exact circumstances 
for humanity to, indeed, “become gods” through a new reinvention of the spirit 
(GS 181). With the death of god, we can go beyond good and evil and address 
pessimism without the old intellectual hang-ups of Western metaphysics. 
Therefore, I read Nietzsche’s affirmative philosophy—that which is produced 
from a critique of Socrates and Christianity—as posing an alternative to the 
problem of pessimism.  
Eternal Recurrence 
 I argue that Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence offers a means by 
which we arrive at an affirmative philosophy that enables us to create new 
values.3 To give us a sort of baseline account of the doctrine, I turn to its first 
utterance:  
The greatest weight. — What, if some day or night a demon were 
to steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 
“This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live 
once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing 
new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh 
and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to 
return to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this 
spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment 
and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside 
down, and you with it, speck of dust!”  
Would you throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and 
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you experienced a 
tremendous moment when you would have answered him: “You 
                                                     
3 Gilles Deleuze rightly points out that “Nietzsche’s most general production is the introductions 
of the concepts of…value into philosophy” (Deleuze 1). Nietzsche has always chiefly been 
concerned with the origin of modern values and how we can formulate new values (in part, the 
inspiration behind his use of genealogical critique).  
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are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.” If this 
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are 
or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, ‘Do 
you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’ would lie 
upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed 
would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing 
more fervently than this ultimate confirmation and seal? (GS 273-
274) 
 Here, the doctrine is given as a thought-experiment—a sublime “What, 
if”—that places us in a world of strange figures and strange ideas. A demon seizes 
us and forces us to inhabit a world of circularity as we live a life determined by 
how we “now live” and how we “have lived it” (GS 273). This raises questions 
about our capability to overcome this cosmological order. We might ask 
ourselves, “What sort of potential do we actually possess to change our lives in 
light of eternal recurrence?” But note the conditional language of “what, if,” and 
“would” (GS 273). Such phrasing seems to speak more to a potential world than 
the actual world. Nietzsche is not explicitly stating, “This is how the world is,” 
but he asks how we might react if the world were like this. As such, we might 
restate his question, “How will we feel when first hearing the thought of eternal 
recurrence?” This line of questioning opens new concerns. If we take the thought 
seriously, are we supposed to live our lives as if eternal recurrence truly is how 
the world is; or, are we supposed to use the doctrine to examine our lives? What 
sort of life would this look like, and is there any positive account given by the 
doctrine? A later characterization of the doctrine put it in dramatically 
deterministic terms: “‘I come again…not to a new life or a better life or a similar 
life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame life, in what is greatest as in 
what is the smallest, to teach again the eternal recurrence of all things’” (Z 333). 
Again, there is a renewed emphasis on the repetition of life exactly as it is, in an 
unaffected or unchanged manner. This seems to problematize the emphasis of GS 
on potentiality rather than actuality. Here, what actually is is exactly what will be 
repeated. Moreover, Z seems to elaborate on this idea that “what is greatest as in 
what is the smallest” (Z 333). This is not a consideration of the generalized, 
ambiguous everything of the GS but the particulars of our lives anchored to the 
self. This selfsameness provides a more specific scope for the doctrine, namely 
one where even the most mundane details of our existence hold a sort of 
existential weight.   
The tension between these two accounts of eternal recurrence highlights 
some of the interpretive issues that arise when considering the doctrine. In the 
literature, the major interpretations construe eternal recurrence either as a 
cosmological doctrine (a more literal reading), a normative doctrine (a figurative 
reading), or as a mere frivolous utterance. While the latter conclusion takes the 
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doctrine in unreasonably bad faith, I find that the former interpretations either 
lack coherence or fail to address the placement of the doctrine in Nietzsche’s 
overall system of thought. As such, I adopt a quasi-normative reading of the 
doctrine influenced by the work of Kofman, Higgins, Magnus, and Dienstag 
where I emphasize the doctrine as strictly a metaphorical account. I find that 
eternal recurrence contains the figurative image and embodiment of the kind of 
psychological process we must undergo in order to properly assess the totality of 
our lives whereby we can begin to overcome suffering and move onward to value 
creation. In this way, the doctrine becomes analogous to Greek art analyzed in BT 
insofar as the doctrine can reconcile us with the suffering of existence whereby 
we can move onward to a stage of creation. The result is a solution to the problem 
of pessimism through an adoption of an attitude identified as “Dionysian 
pessimism” (GS 331). Such an attitude does not attempt to evade pessimism in the 
intellectually unhygienic way of Platonism and Christianity but rather accepts it 
as a spring-board for activity. In this way, the strength of Nietzsche’s doctrine 
becomes clear: eternal recurrence allows us to move beyond the mere spectator 
state induced by Western philosophy (along with its decadent and life-denying 
tendency) to actually engage with the suffering of existence and make something 
of it.  
 I start by affirming the often-stated view that the cosmological reading of 
eternal recurrence does not hold insofar as it is ultimately incoherent. In the major 
works, Nietzsche does not anywhere indicate a literal reading of the doctrine. In 
GS the doctrine is a sublime “what if”; in Z the doctrine is bound to the fictional 
utterances of Zarathustra and his animals; and, in BGE the doctrine is identified in 
passing with the historical development of pessimism and as an “ideal” 
(Heidegger 64). However, in his scattered notes (later compiled as The Will to 
Power), Nietzsche does claim that eternal recurrence is “the most scientific of all 
possible hypothesis” (WTP 36).4 Moreover, in aphorism 1066, Nietzsche 
speculates that “there is a limited quantity of force…time is infinite…[and] space 
is finite” (Williams and Palencik 394-395). However, this aphorism has been 
given significant treatment in the literature (notably, Danto, Magnus, and even 
                                                     
4 Aside from the contentious nature of unpublished material (not to mention its treatment by 
Nietzsche’s sister), I feel that the scholarship has failed to acknowledge the potential for irony in 
this passage. First off, it is redundant to speak of Nietzsche skepticism toward Wissenschaft, so 
much so that one could argue that he goes further to critique systematic knowledge than he does 
Christianity (though an adequate treatment of this critique is beyond the limits of this paper). So, 
with the presence of a word like “scientific,” I have good reasons to be suspicious of any positive 
claims Nietzsche might make. Moreover, I have better reason to read this as Nietzsche being 
ironic. He leads up to this proclamation with a historical tracking of the development of pessimism 
(akin to the passage 56 in BGE), though he forgoes his typical genealogical method. Thus, 
Nietzsche derives eternal recurrence in a quick, superficial, and systematic manner analogous to 
Wissenschaft, a result that he normally would outright reject.  
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Williams and Palencik), and has often been dismissed as “exceedingly garbled” 
insofar as it relies on “no attempt at argument or [coherent] proof” (Danto 187, 
186). The proof given in 1066 seems more speculative than definitive: Danto 
works it out to yield a mere analogy to the “frequency theory of probability” or a 
theory “contrary to the Second Law of Thermodynamics” (Danto 187, 190). 
Magnus finds that the proof ends where “Nietzsche is simply wrong” insofar as “a 
finite sum of energy does not entail a finite number of energy states,” not to 
mention all the ambiguities behind the occurrences of time and the legitimacy of 
identicals (Magnus 85). And Williams and Palencik compound this view by 
highlighting the failure of the proof to derive occurrences that are “absolutely 
identical,” which is necessary for a true recurrence of a selfsame life (395). As 
such, no coherent account of eternal recurrence has been derived from the 
cosmological reading, and every other presentation of the doctrine suggests 
approaching the doctrine in a different light.  
 I also dismiss a traditional normative approach to the doctrine on similar 
grounds. For one, it has been long understood that Nietzsche is patently opposed 
to traditional normativity.5 The first section of Z displays Nietzsche’s diatribe 
where normativity takes the form of a “great dragon…sparkling like gold…on 
every scale shines a golden ‘thou shalt’” that confronts “the spirit of the lion” who 
wishes to be “master in his own desert” (Z 138-139). Here the dragon embodies 
the “values, thousands of years old” that one might aspire to (Z 139). Nietzsche 
does not privilege any one of these “thou shalts” that adorn the dragon. Rather, 
they must all be confronted and overcome by the spirit of the lion (Z 138). The 
collective danger of these values is that they impede the individual desire to will 
(Z 138). This collective must be overcome in order for the spirit of the lion to 
transform into the spirit of “I will” (Z 139). So construed, normativity is a mere 
impediment to the greater transformation that will be undergone by the individual. 
Normativity does not enable an individual to actualize their full potential; rather, 
it stands as a ferocious, glittering obstacle. And it is not clear how the doctrine 
could overcome such an obstacle insofar as its normative content is 
underdetermined. Recall the conditional language of “What, if” and “would” in 
GS; there’s no explicit “must” or “ought” to be found (GS 273-274).  
 Alternatively, I read this conditional language as signifying a non-
traditional normative account of eternal recurrence that goes beyond the mere 
contest of “thou shalts.” The very conditional nature of the language does not 
suggest a specific prescriptive “thou shalt” but invites us to consider what would 
happen if we were to engage with the content of the doctrine. As such, I argue for 
                                                     
5 By “traditional” I have in mind Deontological, Utilitarian, or Divine Command theories where 
an individual submits to an external, universalized law, mirrored by the “thou shalts” of the great 
dragon.  
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a figurative reading where we consider eternal recurrence as if it were true. This 
wouldn’t be a commitment to the reality of eternal recurrence, and, again, it 
wouldn’t be a commitment to any one prescriptive claim. Rather, taken as a 
general metaphor, I argue that the doctrine moves us to consider our attitude 
toward our own existence, including all the suffering posed by pessimism. Such a 
commitment leads to a sort of co-authoring of the doctrine: whatever changes or 
values are derived from the doctrine will be a synthesis its figurative content 
along with the specific life-content and psychological attitude brought by the 
individual. Subsequently, the individual can derive their own “existential 
imperative” whereby they can begin to overcome the suffering of their lives and 
cultivate a specifically Dionysian attitude (Magnus 111).   
 
Figurative Content 
 Before arriving at this imperative, I will examine the linguistic and 
epistemological significance of metaphor in Nietzsche’s system of thought. In an 
early writing, “The Philosopher,” he goes so far as to claim, “There is no ‘real’ 
expression and no real knowing apart from metaphor,” and counts “time, space, 
and causality” among the “metaphors of knowledge” (P 50, 47). Moreover, in 
“On Truth an Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” (TL) Nietzsche makes the further claim 
that words themselves are metaphorical: “What is a word? It is the copy in sound 
of a nerve stimulus…a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. 
The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there 
is a complete overleaping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new 
and different one.” (TL 81-83). This passage not only reveals the systematic 
process by which language-metaphors are formed—there is a physiological and 
vocal process that later becomes associated with a particular image—but it also 
illuminates Nietzsche’s conception of metaphor as a “complete overleaping” of 
spheres (TL 83). Breazeale rightly points out that this conception is consistent 
with the etymology of the Greek word itself, which is derived from a verb 
meaning “to carry over,” “to carry across,” or “to transfer” (xxix). Thus, there is a 
two-fold conception of metaphor: all language is a kind of metaphor, where any 
proposition or language-based claim can only ever be metaphorical, and the 
mechanism of metaphor carries one concept over to another. Breazeale qualifies 
the latter mechanism: “The reason that all knowledge involves metaphor is that 
knowing is supposed to be ‘the adequate expression of an object in the subject’” 
(xxix). Thus, metaphor also bridges object and subject; it places the object in the 
subject. As such, it seems the use of metaphor is inevitable for Nietzsche: so long 
as language is used there is the practice of metaphor wherein this bridging occurs. 
Moreover, metaphor might supersede the mere rhetorical or linguistic and take a 
more ontological status in Nietzsche’s account. Take for instance his description 
of the Apollonian and the Dionysian as “not…purely conceptual” but “plausible 
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embodiments” of the Greek “mystical doctrines of art” (BT 19). Recall that 
Grecian art (in particular, the Apollonian-Dionysiac duality) is Nietzsche’s ideal 
aesthetic framework—it is that which he ultimately hopes to revive. If the Greeks 
saw Apollo and Dionysus as metaphors or symbolic images embodying the 
greater aesthetic principles, then obviously Nietzsche would to want to adopt this 
framework—it leads to his ideal aesthetic life. Kofman expands on this: 
“Metaphor must be understood here not as a rhetorical figure, but as a 
‘substitutive’ image which the poet really perceives in place of the idea” (Kofman 
8). Thus, ontologically, metaphors can stand in place of the objects they refer to; 
they embody the content of the concept they represent and thus affect the world.  
However, all of this conceptual framework fails to speak to the effect of 
metaphor on the individual. When we are placed in the world of the demon, or we 
are invited to reconsider our selfsame life, we are not being asked an intellectual 
question—that is, our rational minds are not being engaged so much as our 
intuition or feelings. “‘How would you feel if…’” Nietzsche asks; he cares about 
our physical and psychological response, e.g., “Would you not throw yourself 
down and gnash your teeth” (Higgins and Solomon 204, GS 274). The metaphor 
most aptly suits this form of engagement because it presents the world as if 
eternal recurrence were true. Nietzsche’s thoughts on language, knowledge, and 
his general skepticism toward rationality or truth contextualize his conception of 
metaphor as ontologically viable, but the greater effect of metaphor justifies its 
usage. Simply, it is better at engaging our feelings. It forces us to directly confront 
the affective experience linked to the greater philosophical idea.  
 With this justification, I turn to the figurative content of eternal recurrence 
via its original presentation in GS. The metaphor begins clearly enough: “some 
day or night” refers to any moment in our lives—which are, indeed, enclosed by 
days and nights—as to add a sense of urgency to our total life (GS 273). It is not 
as if we will be faced with eternal recurrence at any particular time where we 
may be disposed to react in a particular way. Rather, we must be prepared to 
confront eternal recurrence at any point in our lives. From here we are introduced 
to “a demon” who has the ability to “steal after [us] into [our] loneliest loneliness” 
(GS 273). But it’s not immediately clear what this demon stands in place of. It 
could represent a literal arbiter of our lives, a kind of deity, though that would run 
counter to Nietzsche’s criticism of otherworldly thought. Perhaps then the demon 
might be a sort of pagan symbol for chance, the mere means of interruption. This 
makes sense given the randomness with which we will be faced with eternal 
recurrence; it is just by chance that we are faced with the doctrine. And in Z 
Nietzsche speaks of chance as “Over all things…the heaven chance… ‘By 
chance’—that is the most ancient nobility of the world” (Z 278). It is inherently 
opposed to “Purpose” and “‘rationality’” and carries with it “freedom and 
heavenly cheer” (Z 278). Such praise might seem opposed to the fact that the 
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demon has the potential to “crush” us, but the demon also has the potential to 
move us to “crave nothing more fervently” than this situation (GS 273-274). 
However, Zarathustra’s characterization of chance is a little too grandiose 
compared with this demon. Chance takes a more active role in manipulating 
Zarathustra: it “conceals [its] stars,” it doesn’t “speak,” it “[proclaims its] wisdom 
to [Zarathustra],” it shares his “grief,” and shares his “sun” (Z 276). But the 
demon of eternal recurrence merely confronts us with the doctrine. The demon 
itself takes no action toward eternal recurrence; it merely examines us and 
vanishes. Even though the demon might resemble chance with its randomness and 
domination, ultimately, it does not play an active role compared to the content of 
the doctrine itself. As such, the demon is a mere ambiguity (perhaps borne out of 
Nietzsche’s infamous poetics) to be discarded from the greater metaphorical 
content of the doctrine 
The content of the doctrine remains: “‘This life as you now live it and 
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and 
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought 
and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return 
to you, all in the same succession and sequence” (GS 273). Again, waking life is 
repeated exactly as it is. But this cannot be a literal repetition; after all, I want to 
read this metaphorically. Rather, it must be a sort of counterfactual, a life 
imagined as if it were to be repeated. Thus, the metaphor here transfers the 
concept of an eternally repeated life into our actual, finite lives: this is what is 
supposed to be the embodiment of our lives. But what effect does this metaphor 
have? The aphorism teaches us what to consider:  
Would you throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse 
the demon who spoke thus? Or have you experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: “You are a god and 
never have I heard anything more divine.”… Or how well disposed 
would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing 
more fervently than this ultimate confirmation and seal? (GS 273-
274) 
Would this metaphorical existence be one of pain and resentment? Or, would 
something of our actual life be transferred over that would make us praise the 
demon who has enlightened us to this existence? Ultimately, then, this interplay 
between our actual life and our figurative life is what Nietzsche is interested in.  
 As Higgins and Solomon rightly point out, “The metaphor of weight here 
becomes an important piece of the puzzle” (Higgins and Solomon 204). After all, 
it is the very first metaphor given in the doctrine. It appears again in the passage: 
“[eternal recurrence] would lie upon [our] actions as the greatest weight” (GS 
274). It suggests that by taking the situation seriously this figurative existence can 
inform our actual existence, serving as a sort of weight upon our actions. In light 
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of the doctrine, we can no longer act as if our actions are mere occurrences 
without metaphysical weight. Rather, a serious consideration of the doctrine 
would mean that our actions solely determine our ontology; any action we take 
will be that which literally defines our life for eternity. Hence, the greatest weight 
becomes a metaphor about the metaphor: once we act as if eternal recurrence is 
real, it becomes real in the sense that it becomes the standard by which we 
evaluate our actions. Moreover, the weight of each action—that is, our 
psychological reaction to their recurrence—will allow us to assess the values 
entailed by those actions and the sort of attitudes they cultivate within us. This 
reading then begins to reveal a kind of normativity. Even though we are not 
necessarily committed to taking the doctrine seriously, Nietzsche claims that we 
can take the doctrine seriously and thereby add a certain metaphysical weight to 
our actions.  
Stages of Recurrence 
But what that weight looks like, what the “visual and conceptual representation” 
offered by eternal recurrence is remains uncertain (Magnus 142). I concede that 
GS does not offer a complete image of eternal recurrence but must be 
complimented with an analysis of Z, the text whose “basic idea” is a continuation 
of “the penultimate section of the fourth book” of GS—that is, the first utterance 
of eternal recurrence (EH 296). In articulating the figurative content of the 
doctrine, I adopt Kathleen Higgins strategy in her treatment of the “On the Three 
Metamorphoses” section of Z. This section offers a clearer image of the process 
we would undergo if we take eternal recurrence seriously. By Higgins’ account, 
eternal recurrence can be articulated in three distinct stages of transformation 
whereby we learn “how the spirit becomes a camel; and the camel, a lion; and the 
lion, finally, a child” (Z 137).  Accordingly, the doctrine of eternal recurrence is 
expanded to resemble our ever-changing feelings toward our lives and the various 
stages of maturity we might undergo as we examine each aspect of our lives. In 
each of these stages, the individual applies the immediate doctrine (the cyclical 
utterance of GS) to their lives to assess what sort of states and attitudes they 
would adopt if they were to repeat a particular stage eternally. Like my stated 
view, Higgins sees the metaphor of transformation as offering a real 
understanding of “the inner dynamics involved in value creation” (Higgins 50). 
Each of the three metaphorical stages corresponds to a literal past, present, and 
future of the individual where the metaphorical weight of eternal recurrence is 
applied. Taken through each metaphorical cycle within eternal recurrence—what I 
call “stages of recurrence”—the individual can overcome “the repetition of 
harmful patterns” and end in a state whereby they can be reconciled with the 
totality of their lives and move onward to a state of creation which can be 
identified with an affirmative philosophy (Higgins 50). This is a state not unlike 
the immersion that occurs in Dionsyian revelry, and this will contribute to a 
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merging of the aesthetics of BT with this later aesthetics of eternal recurrence. 
Thus, the figurative content of eternal recurrence is a synthesis of the 
metaphorical weight of our actions and their values along with the recurring 
stages that our spirit must undergo to be led to a total evaluation of our lives.  
 The stages of recurrence are as follows: first, the spirit asks, “What is 
difficult?” and assumes the stage of the camel to load itself with burdens (Z 138). 
But this bearing of burdens is void of positive content as the camel merely loads 
itself with existential questions: “What is most difficult…that I may take it upon 
myself and exult in my strength? Is it not humbling oneself to wound one’s 
haughtiness? Letting one’s folly shine to mock one’s wisdom? Or is it this…Or is 
it this…Or is it this…” (Z 138). The camel never answers any of these questions 
so long as it is locked in a state of burdened contemplation. The spirit must “speed 
into the…loneliest desert” to begin the second transformation: “here the spirit 
becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom and be master in his own desert” 
(Z 138). However, to conquer his freedom and thereby truly become his own 
master, the lion must “[seek] out his last master: he wants to fight him…the great 
dragon” (Z 138). As seen above, this great dragon is the embodiment of “Thou 
shalt” and it is only through vanquishing this dragon that the spirit can begin to 
affirm “I will” (Z 139). But all the lion can ever do is fight with the great dragon 
of values: the spirit must undergo a final transformation “to create new values” (Z 
139). Hence the child:  
What can the child do that even the lion could not do?... The child 
is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-
propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred “Yes.” For the game of 
creation, my brothers, a sacred “Yes” is needed: the spirit now 
wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now 
conquers his own world. (Z 139)  
Thus, the stages of recurrence end with the individual assuming the status of the 
self-propelled wheel capable of affirming “Yes” to life.  
 As concerns the values of the individual, the camel stage is associated 
with those that are “ascetic, life-denying values,” as well as that of “reverence” 
necessary in later stages to create new values (Higgins 52). Like the ascetic, the 
camel is left alone to bear the burden of repeated questioning: there is no resolve 
but only the continual mediation. This questioning is full of temptation, hunger, 
deafness, repulsion, despising, fear, and difficulty (Z 138). As such, its attitude 
can be identified with life-denial. The camel cannot alleviate itself of its burdens. 
Rather, it merely waits with all the questions on its back and despairs of life. 
However, the necessity of this stage is derived from its sense of reverence: “What 
is most difficult, O heroes…that I may take it upon myself and exult in my 
strength? Is it not humbling to oneself to wound one’s haughtiness? Letting one’s 
folly shine to mock wisdom?” (Z 138). The camel appeals to those who have 
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carried such burdens before and shows humility by questioning even its 
haughtiness and wisdom. As such, the camel stage contains both the recognition 
of the past as well as the beginnings of reconciliation with it. The camel not only 
wants to carry that which has been carried by past heroes but wishes to do so with 
an acknowledgement of its own past full of moments of humility, haughtiness, 
folly, and wisdom. But in choosing to bear these burdens—in choosing to tether 
itself to the past through a relentless questioning—the camel “restricts one’s 
vision, encourages hostility toward what is new, and ‘knows only how to preserve 
life, not engender it’” (Higgins 53). As such, if the individual were to recur in this 
stage eternally, they would only ever bear the burden of their existence and make 
nothing of it. We think of all our choices, all the consequences of our actions, and 
those things which have defined and composed our lives. Though this is 
inevitably a painful and thereby cathartic consideration—we come to fathom all 
our suffering, our pains, our regrets—we are merely left in a state of 
contemplation. We are left searching for that “tremendous moment” that would 
compel us to seek out “the ultimate confirmation and seal” of eternal recurrence 
(GS 273-274). But even if we find such a moment to motivate our, “Yes,” we are 
stuck with the trappings of this stage. We merely define ourselves relative to our 
past despite our potential to propel ourselves into the future  
The lion stage moves the spirit closer to the engendering of life through a 
cultivation of aggression toward that which impedes the will. The lion actively 
combats the burden of the camel; it can push all these burdens off onto the symbol 
of the gold-scaled dragon and begin “to negate precisely the claims that were 
treasured in the camel phase” (Higgins 52). As such, the spirit is no longer 
weighed down by the burden of individuation—that is, the burden of every 
judgement involved in that selfsame life. These burdens formerly are projected 
onto the great dragon whereby the spirit can antagonize all imposing values 
equally through a divine “No” (Z 139). Ironically, though this is the battle cry of 
freedom, the lion stage is still insufficient for the creation of new values. The lion 
is “absorbed in the project of negating what [past] values, the lion as much as the 
camel is defined by [its past]” (Higgins 53). The lion cannot truly be free so long 
as it is stuck in this battle with the past; it still orients itself according to the 
influence of the past and defines itself “in terms of exactly those contents” 
(Higgins 53). Even though the individual is now moved to an active consideration 
of their past and present, they define themselves only in terms of that past and 
present. If the individual were to recur in this stage eternally, they could never 
arrive at an actual feeling toward their lives insofar as they are consumed in the 
act of rigorously investigating and thereby rejecting it.  Ultimately, then, the lion 
stage ends in a sort of nihilism that leaves the individual denying life.  
 With the coming of the child stage, the spirit finally arrives at an attitude 
of “great health” insofar as “a child is not a being that completely rejects [that 
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which has come before]” (Higgins 53, EH 298). Though the child is essentially 
separated from the past in that it is, after all, a child, it may still “[take] its 
bearings from what its elders teach it” and thereby use the past for its own 
creation of new values. In other words, the child is no longer defined in terms of 
the past, as the lion, but rather accepts and uses the past in the figuration of the 
present and future. The child is most apt for this final stage in that the spirit can 
then have a certain childlike wonder going forward as it continues to face 
hardships in life—it possesses the capacity to take any burden or imposition, 
weigh it, and shape it as it sees fit. Thus, there is a sense of play with one’s life. 
Though this might seem to deflate any sense of existential weight that our actions 
have going forward, really, it is a seizure of that weight and a sort of rapturous 
acceptance of it as fodder for creation. In other words, the weight remains, but the 
spirit now can take the weight and shape it as it wills with a sacred “Yes.” It is 
only this stage which completes the doctrine of eternal recurrence insofar as it is a 
full consideration of one’s total life. With its creative and curious potential, the 
individual in the child stage is not limited to any one mode of consideration of 
their past, present, and future.  As such, the individual can accept the past while 
moving beyond it. All the pain of our past still informs our decisions, it can now 
be taken up like a plaything and molded into whatever we desire. We can begin to 
cultivate the attitude of Dionysian pessimism where we go forward and create 
using the totality of our lives. We have undergone the full transformation of the 
spirit by applying the weight of eternal recurrence.  
Existential Imperative and Dionysian Pessimism through BT 
What more, I claim that from this metaphor of eternal recurrence, we find 
an imperative by which we can live a more vital life. Recall that the whole 
motivation for the doctrine of eternal recurrence is Nietzsche’s disavowal of 
Western philosophy and its failure to overcome the problem of pessimism as 
prefigured in BT. As such, the attitude resulting from the doctrine must address 
this problem. However, insofar as this is a quasi-normative account, the resulting 
answer will not be a dogmatic “thou shalt” but an existential imperative whereby 
the individual can overcome pessimism if they take the doctrine seriously. I 
instead argue that the attitude cultivated in the child stage of recurrence allows the 
individual to overcome pessimism through a reconciliation with the suffering of 
existence that leads to a state of creation. In this way, the attitude mirrors the 
Dionysian aesthetics expounded in BT whereby it can be rightly called 
“Dionysian pessimism.”6  
                                                     
6 Recall that the presence of the Dionysian necessitates the presence of the Apollonian. However, 
here the emphasis is on the Dionysian insofar as it reconciles the individual with suffering and 
moves them to a state of creation. The Apollonian is not our focus insofar as it simply shapes up 
our image of reality and makes things beautiful. The assumption here is that humans do not 
typically have adverse reactions or form unhealthy attitudes in light of beautiful things (fairly so). 
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The quasi-normative existential imperative has three major components: 
value evaluation, a confrontation with pessimism, and the resulting attitude of 
Dionysian pessimism. The first major component consists of a direct 
confrontation of our values through the weight of eternal recurrence. Values 
determine what actions we deem worthy and unworthy as well as the attitudes we 
have in response to events. As Magnus puts it, “attitudes toward life are to be read 
as symptoms of the condition of the person having the attitude” where values are 
those conditions producing the attitude (Magnus 142). Given the weight of 
eternity posed by the doctrine, our actions no longer become superfluous or 
contingent but represent what values we deem “worthy of infinity” (Magnus 143). 
If we respond to the doctrine in anguish—whether we take it merely as a painful 
burden, like the camel, or with a spirit of antagonism, like the lion—than we must 
be assenting to “harmful” or unhealthy values insofar as we have an attitude of 
despair or anger leading to actions borne out of these attitudes (Higgins 50). 
Alternatively, if we respond to the doctrine with the joy of a child than we must 
be cultivating those values which truly befit our lives. Consequently, the stages of 
recurrence allow us to assess what kind of values we assent to in terms of their 
actual value to us—would we choose these values eternally? And by this account, 
the adequacy of the stages model becomes clear. Our values change throughout 
the different stages of our lives. We might not always assent to the same values at 
the same time. But insofar as our lives are a totality of these changing values, we 
must still confront what values we have lived by and what values we are living 
by. Only then can the imperative begin to take hold: live by the values by which 
you would want to live eternally. Such an edict breaks with traditional normative 
claims insofar as its scope is as wide as the participating individuals and their 
chosen values. There is no particular set of values prescribed but merely those that 
correspond with the spirit of the child in the face of eternal recurrence.  
The ultimate test for these values is to overcome an eternity of pessimism. 
Recall that the motivation for the doctrine is what Nietzsche sees as a failure of 
Western philosophy to address pessimism. The Platonic-Christian model is to 
build an alternative life (one that denies this life) rather than confront the actual 
suffering of this life. The Schopenhauerean model is to reject life and limit the 
potential for suffering in doing so. But Nietzsche’s doctrine poses the possibility 
of an “endless suffering” such that “the will to eternal recurrence” is a total 
acceptance of that suffering (Dienstag 934). On the one hand, this illustrates the 
logic of the doctrine in relation to pessimism. Unlike traditional Western 
philosophy, the doctrine does not posit eternity to escape suffering but develops 
eternity as suffering in order to confront it: nothing is going to change, life will 
always be suffering. Note that this does not commit Nietzsche to life as only 
                                                     
Rather, it is suffering which poses a problem for humanity insofar as we evade, reject, and form 
unhealthy habits in light of it (hence, the problematic state of inertia, paralysis, spectatorship, etc.).  
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suffering insofar as the doctrine is still a figuration. But it does apply the weight 
of eternity to suffering as to eliminate the possibility of avoidance. Rather, the 
imperative resulting from the doctrine is a possible response when confronting an 
eternity of suffering. Just as one might evade suffering by denying life (or escape 
it all together by positing another life), one may also embrace suffering. 
Moreover, this embrace does not have to lead to a “passive nihilism” entailed by 
Socratic despair of life where we might envision an individual lamenting, “There 
will always be some suffering. My actions cannot ameliorate suffering. I cannot 
go on” (Magnus 140). In the same vain, the individual can assess what sort of 
values correspond with the actions and attitudes worthy of infinity and pursue the 
cultivation of those actions and attitudes. Thus, Nietzsche’s anecdote for 
pessimism develops an alternative imperative that has been neglected by Western 
philosophy: rather than avoidance or inaction, act so as to crave nothing more 
than eternity even if that eternity is one of suffering.  
Finally, then, the sort of attitude that would crave a possible eternity of 
suffering is the attitude of Dionysian pessimism. This attitude reconciles the 
individual with suffering and thereby allows them to create in light of that 
suffering. Really, this claim follows from the first two components of the 
imperative. Insofar as the stages of recurrence allow the individual to assess their 
values, ultimately, the stages end with an ability “to create new values” as the 
individual “now wills his own will” (Z 139). Accordingly, the evaluation of 
values is a condition of creation. If we seriously consider the doctrine by which 
we arrive at the imperative, we fulfill the imperative by the act of value-creation. 
Though borne out of the backward-looking assessment, this action is exclusively 
forward-willing as it is neither a mere consideration or antagonistic nay saying. 
Thus, the fulfillment of the imperative must be a creative act if the individual has 
truly overcome their past and present values. But this creativity can only come 
after a total acceptance of suffering insofar as it is every joy and every pain which 
must be considered in true eternal recurrence. Again, as the individual moves 
through the stages of recurrence, they must finally overcome the possibility of an 
eternity of each and every thing, including whatever suffering they have faced. 
Ultimately, then, Nietzsche’s existential imperative declares that we ought to use 
the doctrine of eternal recurrence to assess our values, reconcile ourselves to the 
suffering of life, and thereby overcome that suffering through a cultivation of 
values that correspond to an attitude of Dionysian pessimism—that is, creativity 
in the face of formlessness.  
However, how this attitude is precisely a Dionysian attitude can only be 
understood through the aesthetics of BT. Most obviously, we can parallel the 
historical importance of the doctrine with the Greek tragic art of BT. In the same 
way that Nietzsche sees Greek tragic art as a “pessimism of strength” likewise can 
Dionysian pessimism be identified as both embrace and create in light of suffering 
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(BT 17). In BT Nietzsche marks a decline with the loss of Greek art—that is, an 
inherently pessimistic art. This decline, then, can be identified with a tendency to 
evade or reject pessimism. Such a rejection leads to an enfeebled art dominated by 
the spectator mindset that removes the audience from an actual acquaintance with 
life (including all its suffering). This spectator mindset is doubled-over with the 
rationalism of Socrates, which only advances with through Platonism and 
Christianity. And in the state of crisis after the death of God (and the failure of 
Western philosophy overall to account for a pessimistic reality), only an aesthetic 
device equal to Greek tragic art can revitalize the individual and enable them to 
move beyond their unhealthy attitudes and values. Eternal recurrence is that 
device and, as such, Dionysian pessimism is the restorative attitude equal to the 
attitude cultivated by Greek tragic art. For Nietzsche, they are the two grand 
solutions to the problem of pessimism. And in this historical analogy, then, the 
aesthetics of BT can be transplanted to the attitude of Dionysian pessimism 
insofar as they both overcome suffering in the same manner.  
Chiefly, both the Dionysian of Greek tragic art and the attitude of 
Dionysian pessimism respond to the suffering of existence with activity. This 
activity can be understood in contrast to the inactivity cultivated by an evasion or 
rejection of suffering. The Greek tragic art of BT is opposed to the spectator 
mindset of Euripides’ theatre and Socratic philosophy. The former is identified as 
a vitalizing art whereas the latter are identified with decline. However, it is the 
Dionysian impulse of that tragic art which eliminates the possibility of 
spectatorship. Recall that the Dionysian is cultivated through the satyr chorus so 
that the tragic will conditions the audience into a state of tragic reverie. And with 
the advent of the tragic hero, the audience aligns with the suffering on the stage 
and thus participates in the total aesthetic phenomena of the tragic art. The 
Apollonian secures the intelligibility of this phenomena through its stricture of 
forms (whether that be music, mask, or individuals). But the Dionysian eliminates 
spectatorship by dissolving the audience into the aesthetic phenomena of the 
tragedy. Likewise, the attitude of Dionysian pessimism is cultivated through the 
various stages of eternal recurrence, which demand that the individual apply the 
weight of eternity to their actions, attitude and values. The doctrine leads no room 
for spectatorship insofar as it demands a consideration of the totality of life: the 
individual actively undergoes recurrence when evaluating their life. Moreover, the 
doctrine’s form—that is, metaphor—requires the same subsuming of the 
individual. The literal content of the life of an individual must be placed within 
the figurative content of the doctrine in order for activity to begin. The end result 
of that subsuming is one of activity: the spirit is transformed through the stages 
until it ends with the activity of value-creation. Thus, neither the Dionysian of BT 
nor the attitude of Dionysian pessimism permit inactivity insofar as they seize the 
individual and transform them into activity. 
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As that activity is identified as intoxication and dance in BT, the attitude of 
Dionysian pessimism likewise involves intoxication and dance. First, there is the 
initial intoxication of pain one experiences when bearing the totality of their lives 
under the weight of eternity—that is, an eternity potentially full of suffering. 
Moreover, there is the intoxication one cultivates through the stages of recurrence 
that ends in creation. This state is most aptly described as an intoxication of 
creativity, a reverie at the prospect of an eternity of self-willing. And that self-
willing may be understood as dance through the lens of the result of tragedy in 
BT. The tragic dance of BT builds as we are “stirred” and we move closer to 
“nature itself” (as we, indeed, examine what is and how we feel about it) (BT 22). 
What more, this dance is the dance of rapture in light of tragic awareness. As it is 
through the stages of recurrence that the individual now attains this tragic 
knowledge, this dance becomes the act of constant creation, or self-willing, for 
the spirit in the child stage. It is at this stage that the individual has been 
reconciled with an eternity of suffering whereby “there may be eternal joy in 
creating…that the will to life might say Yea to itself in all eternity” (TI 119). Such 
an attitude is one of constant activity, constant aesthetic movement, analogous 
only to dance, a frenzy of aesthetic phenomena that affirms rather than denies life.  
Yet, the Dionysian of BT is also characterized by an element of 
forgetfulness which nuances this attitude. Such a characteristic seems at odds with 
the initial doctrine: how might we reconcile a total consideration of one’s life in 
relation to eternity whilst also forgetting oneself? More importantly, how are we 
to arrive at an attitude wherein we take material from our past life and incorporate 
it as creative material if we have forgotten that material in the first place? Perhaps 
we might take our cue from a later passage of BT wherein the Dionysian is that 
which “[finds] an even higher satisfaction in the annihilation of concrete 
semblances” (BT 142). Here the forgetfulness function is spoken of in terms of 
how it relates to Apollonian illusions, or those “semblances” which have stood as 
“concrete” fixtures in our lives (BT 142). Really, then, Dionysian forgetfulness is 
more of that initial destructive power we see most accurately in the lion stage 
wherein we do combat the various “Thou shalts” which have formerly ruled our 
lives. On the one hand, we forget these values in order to move past them; in the 
act of forgetfulness we deny whatever former weight they may have had for our 
lives. On the other hand, there is a further step of forgetfulness in forgetting these 
concrete semblances as solely opposed to our lives. In other words, we must 
further forget that these concrete semblances are only our enemies wherein we 
can appropriately use them as creative material in the future.  
Taken together, then, these three characteristics of intoxication, dancing, 
and forgetfulness characterize an attitude toward pessimism that can most aptly be 
called Dionysian. Through the Dionysian movement we come closer to the state 
of nature. What this really means , however, is that through a confrontation of 
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every pain and every joy of our lives in eternal recurrence, we begin to see the 
absolute necessity of suffering in life—that it is, in fact, nature. Hence, we begin 
to see the vitality implicit in Greek tragic art: “the infliction of pain [is] 
experienced as joy while a sense of supreme triumph [elicits] cries of anguish 
from the heart” on stage through the tragic hero wherein the Greeks are moved to 
face their own pain and anguish (BT 27). But as we move from merely bearing the 
suffering of life, to fighting against that which seems to contribute to the suffering 
of life, to the final stage of acceptance and creation in light of that suffering, the 
“horror of existence [fades] away in enchantment” (BT 145). We, in fact, crave to 
return to this selfsame life because it is suffering: it is still the ground on which 
we can create new values, it is still the grounds of the experience of vital life. As 
such, we indeed become “[members] of a higher community” wherein the “tiger 
and panther lie down and caress [our] feet” (BT 23, 124). On the one hand, we 
become a part of a higher community insofar as we can adequately address 
pessimism unlike the base communities of the life-denying philosophers (Socrates 
and Christianity). On the other hand, this is the mystic oneness of existence 
spoken of; this is the union of humanity with what is the case: suffering! And 
suffering becomes a mere loving part of the phenomena of life: we assume the 
role of Zarathustra surrounded by all things of crying, laughing, “glowing and 
strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains” (Z 327). It is this role 
that the Greek audience assumed under the influence of tragic art, that decayed 
into a spectator state under the influence of the Euripidean theatre and the 
philosophy of Socrates, that turned to life-denial decadence at the hands of 
Platonism and Christianity, and that was revised through the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence posed by Nietzsche. In this sense, then, Nietzsche truly becomes “the 
last disciple of the philosopher Dionysus…the prophet of eternal recurrence” (TI 
120). Through an understanding of his teachings—in particular, the framing and 
aesthetics of BT—we can overcome the otherwise debilitating, inactive state of 
pessimism and, instead, become a “self-propelled wheel” who affirms life through 
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Beyond Good and Evil       (BGE) 
The Birth of Tragedy        (BT) 
The Gay Science        (GS) 
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”      (TL) 
“The Philosopher”         (P) 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra        (Z) 
Twilight of the Idols         (TI) 
Ecce Homo         (EH) 
The Will to Power        (WTP) 
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